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Summary
This paper studies private saving decisions in Latin America in the 1990s, with special
focus on corporate saving. We investigate the puzzling omission of corporate saving in private
saving studies, and afterwards we calculate, in several cases for the first time, gross saving and
sources of funds of the corporate sector in seven Latin American countries over the period 1990-
1996. Also, we conduct a preliminary econometric exploration on the macroeconomic
determinants of private and corporate saving, and private investment. Particularly, the effect of
capital-market imperfections and the relationship between corporate and personal savings are
analyzed.
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1Introduction
In spite of the crucial role that private saving and financial factors play in every
development process, most academic and professional research continues to be based on national
aggregates whose informational content is rather limited. For instance, there is scarce available
data on corporate and household saving for many developing countries, and the financial position
of the corporate sector is also unknown in most cases.
The goal of this investigation is to fill this gap for some Latin American countries. In this
sense, the paper makes some original applied contributions to the fields of saving and corporate
finance. In the first place, the relevance of corporate saving for the analysis of private saving is
emphasized, providing new -in several cases, previously nonexistent- measures of private
corporate saving and sources of funds for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and
Venezuela. Also, the effect of capital-market imperfections, and the relationship between
corporate and personal savings are explored through econometric tools.
The organization is as follows: In Section 1, we argue that the omission of corporate
saving in studies of private saving, in both Latin American and other countries, may be
unjustified and misleading. In Section 2, we proceed to measure gross corporate saving in seven
countries of the region using a flow-of-funds technique. In Section 3, we conduct an econometric
analysis to estimate the relevance of capital market imperfections on private saving and
investment and the link between corporate and household saving. The evidence supports the
presumption that capital-market imperfections affect private saving and investment decisions and
that the household and corporate components of private saving are not perfect substitutes of each
other. Some conclusions and policy implications close.
2Section 1: Why is Corporate Saving Overlooked? Implications for
Theory and Policy
The voluminous literature devoted to the study of saving rates is a clear testimony of its
importance for academic and policy purposes. However, it is widely recognized that the debate
about the forces behind the dynamics of saving across countries and time is far from settled (see
Edwards (1995)).  Research effort has focused almost exclusively on the household behavior,
highlighting the role of permanent income and life cycle considerations. One striking point is that
corporate saving (defined as retained earnings plus depreciation) is usually ignored.
Three reasons may be offered to justify this omission, two of them of a theoretical nature
and the remaining of a practical one. In principle, as far as households are the owners of
corporations, the analysis should concentrate on the private sector as a whole. In other words,
households are assumed to pierce the corporate veil. A second pretext relies on the perfect
competition paradigm that long-run corporate profits are zero and consequently saving at
corporate level is negligible. Lastly, the practical reason is simply that national saving is
calculated as a residual and data availability does not allow to properly discriminate between the
personal and corporate components.
In a perfect capital market (free from transaction costs, information problems, and taxes),
where all agents are able to borrow and lend without limit at the (unique) going interest rate,
consumers undo any change in corporate saving. Under this setting, provided the temporal rate of
preference equals the interest rate, consumption is flat over time and is set according to the
permanent income, compounded by labor income and dividends:
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3where C   is permanent consumption, r is the interest rate, w is labor income, TP and TC are the
personal and corporate taxes, respectively (assumed for simplicity to be lump-sum), DIV are the
dividends, and PROF are the corporate profits (earnings after taxes and interest plus
depreciation).
It is not difficult to observe that in such an environment,  any change in dividends will
not change the value of the firm and the corresponding flow of dividends, since the reduced
retained earnings can be replaced by other sources of funds (debt or stock issues) at the same cost.
This is a corollary of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem. Besides, a revenue-neutral change in the
tax structure, such that dTC= -dTP, would not alter current consumption and saving. In other
words, as far as the permanent income is not modified, private saving will not change before
changes in the dividend policy.
However, a number of factors may cause the dividend policy to alter private saving
decisions. To make the exposition clear, let us classify these factors into corporate and personal
ones:
1.Corporate factors
1.a. For firms suffering financial constraints, an increase in current dividends may reduce
investment and hence permanent dividends. At least since the work of Fazzari et al. (1988), it has
been well documented that some firms find it difficult to substitute retained earnings with the
more expensive (or even unavailable) external funds, a phenomenon explained by information
barriers or transaction costs. In such a case, valuable investment opportunities might be
dismissed, and the intertemporal value of the firm will go down.1 Consequently, current
consumption will diminish, and the saving rate s (s = 1 – C / Y) goes up. 
1.b. For firms with high profits and scarce investment opportunities, an increase in dividends
may increase permanent income. Managers in possesion of abundant cash may pursue activities
                                                                
1 In any case, even if all valuable projects are undertaken, financial expenses would be higher and
dividends lower.
4that increase their personal welfare at the expense of the shareholders. This agency problem
created by these free cash flows implies that shareholders may get a higher return than the firm,
elevating permanent income and consequently current consumption.
2. Personal factors
2.a. Liquidity-constrained or myopic individuals may respond to a change in dividend policy with
a strong change  in current consumption. As shown by Campbell and Mankiw (1990) and Shea
(1996), among others, there is evidence that the consumption of some individuals is related to
current rather than permanent income, as a result of liquidity constraints and/or myopia.2 Under
these circumstances, an increase in current dividends will reduce current private saving, although
permanent dividends remain unchanged. 3
2.b. Reallocations from dividends to labor income may affect total private saving as long as labor
income earnears have a lower saving rate than asset holders do. A revenue-neutral change in
taxes or an increase in wages at the expense of lower dividends, preserving the same permanent
income, will increase private consumption. The crucial assumption is that equity holders are
richer (as it is usually observed) and have a higher marginal propensity to save compared to
recipients of labor income.4
2.c. The propensity to consume out of dividends may be higher than that out of capital gains.
Since capital gains have an important temporary component (see Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay
(1997)) and the changes in dividends are in general persistent, consumers tend to show a higher
propensity to consume out of cash dividends. Also, capital gains may be an imperfect substitute
for dividends whenever secondary stock markets are not liquid enough and/or capital gains are
                                                                
2 It is possible to argue that stockholders, as opposed to those depending solely on labor income, are not
likely to suffer liquidity constraints, and as a result they would not change current consumption whether
current dividends change. However, this should be empirically proved. Besides, myopia might induce the
same behavior even in the absence of liquidity constraints.
3 In the case of small businesses without public offering, labor income and dividends coincide. But it might
happen that liquidity constraints are more severe for consumers than for firms. In such a case, higher
dividends would have a positive effect on current consumption.
5not considered a good collateral, thus elevating the borrowing interest rate. Accordingly, given a
certain value of the firm, an increase in current dividends is likely to provoke a reduction in the
saving rate.5
2.d. If consumers exhibit risk aversion, the dividend policy matters for the saving rate. For the
same earnings potential, higher present dividends will give rise to a higher value of the firm
because the posponed dividend are penalized with a high discount rate. As the expected
permanent income rise, present consumption becomes higher.
In sum, a number of arguments can be presented to dismiss the presumed irrelevance of
corporate saving and, as for the Ricardian equivalence between debt and taxes, the hypothesis
may fail on empirical grounds when some real-world features are integrated into the analysis (see
Poterba (1987)). Households may be unable to fully offset changes in corporate if the marginal
propensity to consume out of labor income differs from the propensity to consume out of capital
gains and if capital market imperfections exist.
Although a detailed account of these phenomena are beyond the scope of this work,
suffice it to say that in view that stock returns have a substantial temporary component (see
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997)), optimizing consumers may be reluctant to change their
consumption based on their share holdings. Under these circumstances, a one-dollar increase in
dividends may translate in more consumption than the same dollar reinvested into the firm, thus
altering total private saving. Besides, there is extensive evidence, initiated by Fazzari et al. (1988)
and recently surveyed by Hubbard (1998), that external finance is more expensive than internal
funds for many firms, creating as a result a link between cash flow and investment; in this sense,
dividend distributions may prevent firms from undertaking valuable projects, eventually affecting
private saving via a reduction in the rate of economic growth. Capital-market imperfections may
                                                                                                                                                                                                
4 In the previous formula, it must be postulated that the rate of time preference (the discount rate) is higher
for the second group.
5 On the other hand, since capital gains are usually taxed at a lower rate than dividends,  higher dividends
may imply a higher permanent income, partially reverting the previous result.
6also modify households' consumption decisions before a change in dividends. First, an increase in
dividends may help relax binding liquidity constraints. Second, capital gains may be an imperfect
substitute for dividends whenever secondary stock markets are not liquid enough and/or capital
gains are not considered a good collateral, thus elevating the borrowing interest rate. In all these
cases, a fall in corporate saving may be less than fully offset by an increase in household saving.
Finally, quantitatively speaking, corporate saving appears to be quite significant. For the
OECD countries, corporate saving represents 54.8% of private saving, ranging from a minimum
of 22% for Italy and a maximum of 79.3% for Denmark (see Table 1). This impression will be
reinforced once the magnitudes corresponding to some Latin American countries be presented
later on.
7Table 1
Components of Gross National Saving in Some OECD Countries, 1990-1994
In percentage of GDP, unless otherwise stated
Country Public Personal Corporate Total Private Corporate Corporate
over Total over Private
In percent In percent
Australia -0.5 7.9 9.0 16.4 16.9 54.9 53.3
Austria 1.6 8.4 15.4 25.4 23.8 60.6 64.7
Belgium -4.4 14.8 10.7 21.1 25.5 50.7 42.0
Canada -3.5 9.8 8.5 14.8 18.3 57.4 46.4
Denmark -0.6 3.7 14.2 17.3 17.9 82.1 79.3
Finland 0.3 8.0 7.7 16.0 15.7 48.1 49.0
France -0.3 9.5 10.7 19.9 20.2 53.8 53.0
Germany 1.1 8.2 13.0 22.3 21.2 58.3 61.3
Italy -6.2 19.2 5.4 18.4 24.6 29.3 22.0
Japan 7.7 13.2 12.4 33.3 25.6 37.2 48.4
Netherlands -0.6 11.6 13.4 24.4 25.0 54.9 53.6
Norway 4.4 4.3 15.1 23.8 19.4 63.4 77.8
Spain -0.3 7.8 12.4 19.9 20.2 62.3 61.4
Sweden -1.9 6.1 10.3 14.5 16.4 71.0 62.8
Switzerland 0.6 13.7 15.9 30.2 29.6 52.6 53.7
United Kingdom -1.7 7.1 8.0 13.4 15.1 59.7 53.0
United States -2.9 9.0 9.1 15.2 18.1 59.9 50.3
Average -0.4 9.5 11.2 20.4 20.8 56.3 54.8
Source: Norman and Owens (1997).
Undisputedly, the utilitarian reason, namely, the lack of reliable information, dominates
all of the other motives for disregarding corporate saving. At least, this is the case for most
developing countries, and Latin America is no exception. Good statistics certainly are luxury
goods. An apparent difficulty for academic and professional economists is that the information
either does not exist or is not publicly available. Until very recently there were virtually no
studies on the subject for any Latin American country. Agosin et al. (1997), Calderon Madrid
(1996), Cardenas and Escobar (1996), and Gonza les de Olarte et al. (1996) carried out studies for
Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru, respectively. In 1997, the World Bank started to assemble a
database on saving rates (see Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1997)), which includes corporate
8saving for a set of 45 countries until 1992. Bebczuk (1996) performed a calculation of corporate
saving in Argentina for 1991-1994, using a framework similar to that developed below.
Before proceeding, some comments about the economic relevance of corporate saving
measures are in order. The observation that corporate saving represents in many cases the
prevailing source of private saving is undoubtedly key to understand the so-called Feldstein-
Horioka's puzzle about the high correlation between national saving and investment rates in both
cross-country and time-series studies. Obstfeld (1995) acknowledges that this mechanism may be
important but also argues that no documentation has been yet produced.
The impact of borrowing constraints and financial openness on the private saving rate
may be greatly enriched should the behavior of households be isolated from that of firms. For
example, Japelli and Pagano (1994) claim that the relaxation of borrowing constraints
discourages household saving, but their empirical application takes total private saving as the
dependent variable, turning their results less meaningful. Along similar lines, the inflow of
foreign saving may crowd-out domestic private saving, as advanced by Cohen (1993) and Reisen
(1997), among others. But, even if proven to be true, the policy design should contemplate the
reaction of each particular sector before taking any corrective measure, since the macroeconomic
effect of any policy will be diametrically different depending on whether it reshapes the
incentives to invest or those to consume.
Tax policy is also bound to be reexamined under a new light. Letting alone the
controversial response of saving to the after-tax rate of return, a reduction of personal taxes -often
advocated to foster household saving- compensated by an increase in corporate taxes may be self-
defeating: provided the marginal propensity to consume out of disposable income exceeds that
from wealth, the net effect may well be a decline in private saving. On top of this, if capital
market imperfections prevail, investment may be adversely affected.
Finally, even under full offsetting, the weight of corporate saving compared to other
sources of funds is a subtle indicator of efficiency of the financial system. In a well-functioning
9financial environment, value-maximizing firms would not care about their liability structure.
Conversely, a high reliance on retained earnings uncovers frictions in the intermediation of funds,
such as transaction costs and information asymmetries.6 The evolution over time of corporate
saving as a proportion of total sources is likely to offer some guidance about the persistence of
these distortions.
                                                                
6 Tax considerations may also affect corporate saving decisions (see Copeland and Weston (1988)).
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Section 2: Measuring Corporate Saving in Latin America, 1990-1996
The original contribution of this section is twofold. First, we will introduce a flow-of-
funds technique to calculate gross private corporate saving that will be applied to Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela for the period 1990-1996. Second, as a
byproduct of the preceding computation, aggregate data on sources of funds for these countries
will be made available.
In what follows aggregate corporate saving is calculated as:
Corporate Saving = Change in Total Assets - Change in Equity - Change in Debt
The change in total corporate assets is approximated by the gross private investment
(including the change in inventories) plus the variation in current assets. The change in equity and
the change in debt correspond to the (net) issues of shares and market debt plus new bank loans,
both in the domestic and international financial markets.
This identity provides a helpful shortcut to calculate corporate saving in that it relies on a
few statistical figures that can be known with a reasonably brief lag and at no cost. Anyway, it
must be noted that the data come from a variety of sources, and in some cases this first-time
collection was anything but easy. Sources are listed at the bottom of each table. For this
procedure to be implemented, some methodological conventions were adopted when the data
availability precluded a more precise estimation.  All assumptions are made explicit at the end in
an Appendix. Nevertheless, these assumptions are relatively innocuous, and we trust that errors
are of second-order. If any, underestimation of corporate saving should be expected.
Corporate saving can be calculated either directly from the financial statements of
nonfinancial firms or as a residual after measuring household saving. In either case, a bulk of
information and assumptions are required. A thorough analysis of possible biases and
11
inadequacies in the calculation of private saving and investment is provided by Schmidt-Hebbel
and Serven (1997). In contrast, the measure introduced in this work, although demanding certain
assumptions, avoids dealing with these difficulties. At the same time, given that national studies
may be based on different methods, our approach offers more transparent intercountry
comparisons. Being pragmatic, it should be reminded that, no matter what procedure is more
precise, most Latin American countries currently lack the needed corporate or household
information to undertake those other methods. Furthermore, both settings should be pursued in
order to double-check accuracy.
Tables 2 through 8 report gross corporate saving in both nominal US dollars and as a
percentage of GDP.
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Table 2
Corporate Saving in Argentina, 1990-1996
In US$ Millions, otherwise indicated
Year Gross International Equity Domestic Domestic Gross Gross Gross Corporate
Investment Debt Issues Debt Bank Corporate Corporate Private as a ratio of
Issues Issues Loans Saving Saving Saving Private Saving
% of GDP % of GDP %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=(1)-(2)- (7) (8) (9)
-(3)-(4)-(5)
1990 18838.2 0.0 4.8 83.0 2295.0 16455.4 11.9 18.5 64.6
1991 26087.0 0.0 182.5 521.0 1040.8 24342.7 13.5 15.7 85.9
1992 37094.7 444.0 107.5 1952.0 3848.0 30743.2 13.6 14.1 96.4
1993 45942.1 4125.4 9439.7 5497.0 4872.8 22007.2 8.5 13.5 63.2
1994 54994.2 3850.6 2058.7 5738.0 2778.2 40568.7 14.4 16.2 89.0
1995 49445.0 2045.0 236.3 4087.0 -653.5 43730.2 15.6 17.3 90.4
1996 51284.1 3700.0 0.0 3259.6 3721.8 40602.7 13.7 17.6 77.8
Average 13.0 16.1 80.9
Sources: Gross Investment (fixed and inventory): International Financial Statistics (IFS) and
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), Country Statistics.
International Debt Issues: IDB, Country Statistics.
Equity Issues: International Capital Markets, International Monetary Fund, November 1997.
Domestic Debt Issues: Novedades de la CNV, Comision Nacional de Valores de la Republica Argentina, various issues.
Domestic Bank Loans: IFS.
Gross Private Saving: Author's calculations based on data from Progreso Economico y Social en America Latina 1996,
IDB, and Balance Economico Preliminar 1997, CEPAL.
For more detailed explanations, see Appendix.
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Table 3
Corporate Saving in Brazil, 1990-1996
In US$ Millions, otherwise indicated
Year Gross International Equity Domestic Domestic Gross Gross Gross Corporate
Investment Debt Issues Debt Bank Corporate Corporate Private as a ratio of
Issues Issues Loans Saving Saving Saving Private Saving
% of GDP % of GDP %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=(1)-(2)- (7) (8) (9)
-(3)-(4)-(5)
1990 60876.5 663.5 780.7 1133.2 -5920.9 64220.0 17.4 15.1 115.2
1991 56326.0 1165.9 684.5 912.2 2906.4 50657.0 13.1 13.8 95.1
1992 52964.5 5342.9 977.4 404.0 10689.8 35550.4 9.5 15.6 61.0
1993 61332.6 7736.0 884.6 3843.6 14492.8 34375.6 8.0 16.5 48.5
1994 85266.0 3784.8 2590.9 11805.6 17757.0 49327.8 8.8 14.1 62.4
1995 109187.5 7186.0 1820.0 7574.0 16151.8 76455.8 10.6 19.9 53.4
1996 113987.2 3280.4 8971.5 8288.6 -5052.9 98499.7 13.1 16.7 78.7
Average 11.5 16.0 72.2
Sources: Gross Investment (fixed and inventory): Statistical Yearbook 1996, CEPAL.
International Debt Issues: IDB, Country Statistics.
Equity Issues: International Capital Markets, International Monetary Fund, November 1997.
Domestic Debt Issues: Comisao de Valores Mobiliarios (CVM), and Brazil Company Handbook 1994/95.
Domestic Bank Loans: IFS.
Gross Private Saving: Author's calculations based on data from Progreso Economico y Social en America Latina 1996,
IDB, Balance Economico Preliminar 1997, CEPAL, and Statistical Yearbook 1996, CEPAL.
For more detailed explanations, see Appendix.
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Table 4
Corporate Saving in Chile, 1990-1996
In US$ Millions, otherwise indicated
Year Gross International Equity Domestic Domestic Gross Gross Gross Corporate
Investment Debt Issues Debt Bank Corporate Corporate Private as a ratio of
Issues Issues Loans Saving Saving Saving Private Saving
% of GDP % of GDP %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=(1)-(2)- (7) (8) (9)
-(3)-(4)-(5)
1990 7314.5 1338.9 208.8 914.0 398.6 4454.2 14.7 20.9 70.2
1991 7532.3 457.3 242.7 1297.0 894.1 4641.2 13.5 20.7 65.1
1992 10246.7 883.4 511.7 954.0 1092.3 6805.3 15.9 20.1 79.1
1993 11682.2 1560.3 944.4 1329.0 769.2 7079.3 15.5 19.2 81.0
1994 12327.7 1840.7 917.2 2356.0 537.8 6676.0 12.8 20.7 61.8
1995 16497.1 2424.6 625.0 2578.0 2509.0 8360.5 12.4 22.2 55.9
1996 19057.7 409.1 1629.9 2659.0 1642.3 12717.4 17.7 20.2 87.4
Average 14.6 20.6 71.1
Sources: Gross Investment (fixed and inventory): International Financial Statistics (IFS) and
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), Country Statistics.
International Debt Issues: IDB, Country Statistics.
Equity Issues: International Capital Markets, International Monetary Fund, November 1997.
Domestic Debt Issues: Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros de Chile.
Domestic Bank Loans: IFS.
Gross Private Saving: Author's calculations based on data from Progreso Economico y Social en America Latina 1996,
IDB, and Balance Economico Preliminar 1997, CEPAL.
For more detailed explanations, see Appendix.
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Table 5
Corporate Saving in Colombia, 1990-1996
In US$ Millions, otherwise indicated
Year Gross International Equity Domestic Domestic Gross Gross Gross Corporate
Investment Debt Issues Debt Bank Corporate Corporate Private as a ratio of
Issues Issues Loans Saving Saving Saving Private Saving
% of GDP % of GDP %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=(1)-(2)- (7) (8) (9)
-(3)-(4)-(5)
1990 4952.6 -149.4 51.9 35.6 -566.4 5581.0 15.7 15.8 99.6
1991 5363.9 -8.4 70.4 60.5 845.8 4395.6 10.3 18.1 57.0
1992 6622.3 8.3 117.4 183.3 1113.1 5200.4 10.6 15.4 68.7
1993 7596.4 -43.2 66.7 444.8 1223.5 5904.5 10.6 9.6 110.8
1994 11327.0 -67.7 559.7 376.0 2784.4 7674.7 10.9 9.0 122.1
1995 12062.7 1494.4 198.9 851.8 1549.8 7967.9 9.9 10.4 95.4
1996 6680.2 477.0 114.7 460.9 804.6 4823.0 5.6 3.3 168.1
Average 10.5 11.7 90.4
Sources: Gross Investment (fixed and inventory): International Financial Statistics (IFS) and
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), Country Statistics.
International Debt Issues: IDB, Country Statistics.
Equity Issues: International Capital Markets, International Monetary Fund, November 1997.
Domestic Debt Issues: Superintendencia de Valores de Colombia.
Domestic Bank Loans: IFS.
Gross Private Saving: Author's calculations based on data from Progreso Economico y Social en America Latina 1996,
IDB, and Balance Economico Preliminar 1997, CEPAL.
For more detailed explanations, see Appendix.
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Table 6
Corporate Saving in Mexico, 1990-1996
In US$ Millions, otherwise indicated
Year Gross International Equity Domestic Domestic Gross Gross Gross Corporate
Investment Debt Issues Debt Bank Corporate Corporate Private as a ratio of
Issues Issues Loans Saving Saving Saving Private Saving
% of GDP % of GDP %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=(1)-(2)- (7) (8) (9)
-(3)-(4)-(5)
1990 52774.0 1864.0 293.7 2317.8 8366.7 39931.9 16.1 22.2 72.6
1991 62501.9 1785.0 3091.9 3872.1 8928.4 44824.5 15.3 16.7 91.9
1992 74542.3 3055.0 1812.2 4955.7 5688.6 59030.9 17.7 13.4 131.9
1993 79239.4 4863.5 2698.8 6782.0 5832.8 59062.4 14.6 13.1 111.4
1994 82897.7 1950.2 4011.9 2017.3 5121.9 69796.4 16.7 13.1 127.5
1995 52380.4 1098.7 1899.1 1087.3 -12654.9 60950.2 21.2 18.0 117.8
1996 63390.3 -166.4 2009.5 1179.4 2511.3 57856.5 17.5 18.7 93.6
Average 17.0 16.4 103.4
Sources: Gross Investment (fixed and inventory): International Financial Statistics (IFS) and
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), Country Statistics.
International Debt Issues: IDB, Country Statistics.
Equity Issues: International Capital Markets, International Monetary Fund, November 1997.
Domestic Debt Issues: Bolsa de Valores de Mexico.
Domestic Bank Loans: IFS.
Gross Private Saving: Author's calculations based on data from Progreso Economico y Social en America Latina 1996,
IDB, and Balance Economico Preliminar 1997, CEPAL.
For more detailed explanations, see Appendix.
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Table 7
Corporate Saving in Peru, 1990-1996
In US$ Millions, otherwise indicated
Year Gross International Equity Domestic Domestic Gross Gross Gross Corporate
Investment Debt Issues Debt Bank Corporate Corporate Private as a ratio of
Issues Issues Loans Saving Saving Saving Private Saving
% of GDP % of GDP %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=(1)-(2)- (7) (8) (9)
-(3)-(4)-(5)
1990 4411.3 -54.0 0.0 0.0 1260.2 3205.1 9.6 13.5 70.7
1991 6101.2 -112.0 0.0 0.0 -121.2 6334.4 14.8 11.7 127.3
1992 6494.7 10.0 0.0 162.0 313.0 6009.7 14.5 12.1 119.8
1993 7013.1 336.0 29.1 73.6 282.6 6291.8 15.2 12.6 120.8
1994 9419.2 609.0 133.0 243.3 664.2 7769.7 15.5 11.4 136.2
1995 12254.6 97.0 0.0 356.9 825.8 10974.9 18.6 14.8 125.9
1996 12231.8 40.0 4.7 756.2 1162.1 10268.8 16.8 11.9 141.2
Average 15.0 12.6 119.4
Sources: Gross Investment (fixed and inventory): International Financial Statistics (IFS) and
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), Country Statistics.
International Debt Issues: IDB, Country Statistics.
Equity Issues: International Capital Markets, International Monetary Fund, November 1997.
Domestic Debt Issues: Comision Nacional Supervisora de Valores y Empresas del Peru.
Domestic Bank Loans: IFS.
Gross Private Saving: Author's calculations based on data from Progreso Economico y Social en America Latina 1996,
IDB, and Balance Economico Preliminar 1997, CEPAL.
For more detailed explanations, see Appendix.
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Table 8
Corporate Saving in Venezuela, 1990-1996
In US$ Millions, otherwise indicated
Year Gross International Equity Domestic Domestic Gross Gross Gross Corporate
Investment Debt Issues Debt Bank Corporate Corporate Private as a ratio of
Issues Issues Loans Saving Saving Saving Private Saving
% of GDP % of GDP %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=(1)-(2)- (7) (8) (9)
-(3)-(4)-(5)
1990 4191.6 -273.0 0.0 0.0 1015.4 2794.0 5.7 25.6 22.5
1991 8450.6 0.0 17.2 655.2 1552.4 6324.2 11.8 19.1 61.8
1992 12604.0 148.0 70.6 556.8 15.4 11562.9 19.1 18.5 103.7
1993 9839.6 -476.0 9.0 807.1 -605.4 10655.8 17.7 15.6 114.0
1994 5933.3 -886.0 88.3 256.2 -721.8 7140.5 12.3 21.4 57.5
1995 10920.1 -422.6 15.3 312.2 704.0 10256.1 13.7 22.4 61.1
1996 10996.0 -294.4 22.8 367.3 -2802.4 13395.8 18.3 24.5 74.5
Average 14.1 21.0 67.1
Sources: Gross Investment (fixed and inventory): International Financial Statistics (IFS) and
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), Country Statistics.
International Debt Issues: IDB, Country Statistics.
Equity Issues: International Capital Markets, International Monetary Fund, November 1997.
Domestic Debt Issues: Santander Investment, Caracas.
Domestic Bank Loans: IFS.
Gross Private Saving: Author's calculations based on data from Progreso Economico y Social en America Latina 1996,
IDB, and Balance Economico Preliminar 1997, CEPAL.
For more detailed explanations, see Appendix.
The most evident conclusion from the preceding tables is that corporate saving
constitutes an overwhelming proportion of private saving in Latin America in the nineties: 80.9%
in Argentina, 72.2% in Brazil, 71.1% in Chile, 90.4% in Colombia, 103.4% in Mexico, 119.4% in
Peru, and 67.1% in Venezuela. Not only is household saving low, but is negative on average in
two out of seven of the countries.7
                                                                
7 The same qualitative conclusion is reached by the country studies surveyed above, but the numerical
results are rather different. The same applies to the private saving rate. Comparability is undermined by
differences in the raw series employed, methodology, and deflation procedures.
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At first glance, corporate saving as a percentage of GDP, unlike total private saving,
appears to be very volatile across time, especially so in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia.  Also
noticeable is the fact that in all countries but Colombia (where a continuous downward trend is
observed), corporate saving was higher in 1995-1996 than in 1991-1994, suggesting that the
Mexican crisis of December 1994 had a sizable repercussion.  Some insights can be derived by
displaying the information in terms of sources of funds, as Tables 9 through 15 do.
Table 9
Sources of Funds of Private Corporate Firms in Argentina, 1990-1996
As a percentage of total sources
Year International Equity Domestic Domestic Corporate Total
Debt Issues Issues Debt Issues Bank Loans Saving
1990 0.0 0.0 0.4 12.2 87.4 100.0
1991 0.0 0.7 2.0 4.0 93.3 100.0
1992 1.2 0.3 5.3 10.4 82.9 100.0
1993 9.0 20.5 12.0 10.6 47.9 100.0
1994 7.0 3.7 10.4 5.1 73.8 100.0
1995 4.1 0.5 8.3 -1.3 88.4 100.0
1996 7.2 0.0 6.4 7.3 79.2 100.0
Average 1990-1996 4.1 3.7 6.4 6.9 79.0 100.0
Average 1991-1994 4.3 6.3 7.4 7.5 74.5 100.0
Average 1995-1996 5.7 0.2 7.3 3.0 83.8 100.0
Source: Table 2.
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Table 10
Sources of Funds of Private Corporate Firms in Brazil, 1990-1996
As a percentage of total sources
Year International Equity Domestic Domestic Corporate Total
Debt Issues Issues Debt Issues Bank Loans Saving
1990 1.1 1.3 1.9 -9.7 105.5 100.0
1991 2.1 1.2 1.6 5.2 89.9 100.0
1992 10.1 1.8 0.8 20.2 67.1 100.0
1993 12.6 1.4 6.3 23.6 56.0 100.0
1994 4.4 3.0 13.8 20.8 57.9 100.0
1995 6.6 1.7 6.9 14.8 70.0 100.0
1996 2.9 7.9 7.3 -4.4 86.4 100.0
Average 1990-1996 5.7 2.6 5.5 10.1 76.1 100.0
Average 1991-1994 7.3 1.9 5.6 17.4 67.7 100.0
Average 1995-1996 4.7 4.8 7.1 5.2 78.2 100.0
Source: Table 3.
Table 11
Sources of Funds of Private Corporate Firms in Chile, 1990-1996
As a percentage of total sources
Year International Equity Domestic Domestic Corporate Total
Debt Issues Issues Debt Issues Bank Loans Saving
1990 18.3 2.9 12.5 5.4 60.9 100.0
1991 6.1 3.2 17.2 11.9 61.6 100.0
1992 8.6 5.0 9.3 10.7 66.4 100.0
1993 13.4 8.1 11.4 6.6 60.6 100.0
1994 14.9 7.4 19.1 4.4 54.2 100.0
1995 14.7 3.8 15.6 15.2 50.7 100.0
1996 2.1 8.6 14.0 8.6 66.7 100.0
Average 1990-1996 11.2 5.6 14.2 9.0 60.2 100.0
Average 1991-1994 10.7 5.9 14.3 8.4 60.7 100.0
Average 1995-1996 8.4 6.2 14.8 11.9 58.7 100.0
Source: Table 4.
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Table 12
Sources of Funds of Private Corporate Firms in Colombia, 1990-1996
As a percentage of total sources
Year International Equity Domestic Domestic Corporate Total
Debt Issues Issues Debt Issues Bank Loans Saving
1990 -3.0 1.0 0.7 -11.4 112.7 100.0
1991 -0.2 1.3 1.1 15.8 81.9 100.0
1992 0.1 1.8 2.8 16.8 78.5 100.0
1993 -0.6 0.9 5.9 16.1 77.7 100.0
1994 -0.6 4.9 3.3 24.6 67.8 100.0
1995 12.4 1.6 7.1 12.8 66.1 100.0
1996 7.1 1.7 6.9 12.0 72.2 100.0
Average 1990-1996 2.2 1.9 4.0 12.4 79.6 100.0
Average 1991-1994 -0.3 2.2 3.3 18.3 76.5 100.0
Average 1995-1996 9.8 1.7 7.0 12.4 69.1 100.0
Source: Table 5.
Table 13
Sources of Funds of Private Corporate Firms in Mexico, 1990-1996
As a percentage of total sources
Year International Equity Domestic Domestic Corporate Total
Debt Issues Issues Debt Issues Bank Loans Saving
1990 3.5 0.6 4.4 15.9 75.7 100.0
1991 2.9 4.9 6.2 14.3 71.7 100.0
1992 4.1 2.4 6.6 7.6 79.2 100.0
1993 6.1 3.4 8.6 7.4 74.5 100.0
1994 2.4 4.8 2.4 6.2 84.2 100.0
1995 2.1 3.6 2.1 -24.2 116.4 100.0
1996 -0.3 3.2 1.9 4.0 91.3 100.0
Average 1990-1996 3.0 3.3 4.6 4.4 84.7 100.0
Average 1991-1994 3.9 3.9 6.0 8.9 77.4 100.0
Average 1995-1996 0.9 3.4 2.0 -10.1 103.8 100.0
Source: Table 6.
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Table 14
Sources of Funds of Private Corporate Firms in Peru, 1990-1996
As a percentage of total sources
Year International Equity Domestic Domestic Corporate Total
Debt Issues Issues Debt Issues Bank Loans Saving
1990 -1.2 0.0 0.0 28.6 72.7 100.0
1991 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -2.0 103.8 100.0
1992 0.2 0.0 2.5 4.8 92.5 100.0
1993 4.8 0.4 1.0 4.0 89.7 100.0
1994 6.5 1.4 2.6 7.1 82.5 100.0
1995 0.8 0.0 2.9 6.7 89.6 100.0
1996 0.3 0.0 6.2 9.5 84.0 100.0
Average 1990-1996 1.4 0.3 2.2 8.4 87.8 100.0
Average 1991-1994 2.4 0.5 1.5 3.5 92.1 100.0
Average 1995-1996 0.6 0.0 4.5 8.1 86.8 100.0
Source: Table 7.
Table 15
Sources of Funds of Private Corporate Firms in Venezuela, 1990-1996
As a percentage of total sources
Year International Equity Domestic Domestic Corporate Total
Debt Issues Issues Debt Issues Bank Loans Saving
1990 -6.5 0.0 0.0 24.2 66.7 100.0
1991 0.0 0.2 7.8 18.4 74.8 100.0
1992 1.2 0.6 4.4 0.1 91.7 100.0
1993 -4.8 0.1 8.2 -6.2 108.3 100.0
1994 -14.9 1.5 4.3 -12.2 120.3 100.0
1995 -3.9 0.1 2.9 6.4 93.9 100.0
1996 -2.7 0.2 3.3 -25.5 121.8 100.0
Average 1990-1996 -4.5 0.4 4.4 0.8 96.8 100.0
Average 1991-1994 -4.6 0.6 6.2 0.0 98.8 100.0
Average 1995-1996 -3.3 0.2 3.1 -9.5 107.9 100.0
Source: Table 8.
Consistent with earlier results, corporate saving is by far the most important source of
funds (80.6% for the whole sample). Bank loans, domestic debt, international debt, and equity
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contribute with 7.4%, 5.9%, 3.3%, and 2.5% of the total, respectively.8 These percentages give
definite support to the pecking order hypothesis, coined by Myers (1984), according to which
firms prefer internal funds to debt, and debt to equity. Among the debt sources, banks are the
chief suppliers of external financing, while international loans are still limited in spite of the
increasing financial integration to international markets. It can also be noticed that the average
proportions over the entire period are rather similar across countries, although larger variations
seem to occur on a year-by-year basis.
The pairwise correlation matrix among the different sources of funds unveils another
interesting pattern, as shown by the following table:
Table 16
Correlations among Sources of Funds in Latin America, 1990-1996
International Equity Domestic Domestic Corporate
Debt Issues Issues Debt Issues Bank Loans Saving
International Debt Issues 1.00
Equity Issues 0.38 1.00
(0.007)
Domestic Debt Issues 0.59 0.51 1.00
(0.000) (0.000)
Domestic Bank Loans 0.27 0.03 0.11 1.00
(0.065) (0.853) (0.454)
Corporate Saving -0.71 -0.47 -0.61 -0.78 1.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
* p-values in parenthesis.
Market sources (international debt, domestic debt, and equity) appear to be positively
correlated with each other, but much weakly with bank loans, while corporate saving is
negatively correlated with all alternative sources. In principle, the first feature may be revealing
that the access to any market source has a signaling role for other providers of funds. The second
                                                                
8 It must be noted that 55% of total equity issues is explained by the privatization process. Information on
privatization revenues by form of divestiture comes from IDB (1997).
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characteristic may be indicating that the incentives to save on the part of private firms are to some
extent inversely linked to the availability of external sources. This point will be further developed
in Section 3.
 To offer a comparative standard, Table 17 shows the sources of funds for a group of
OECD countries over the period 1990-1995:
Table 17
Sources of Funds of Non-financial Corporations
Selected OECD Countries, 1990-1995
In percentage of total sources
Country Debt Equity Corporate Total
Saving
Austria -2.7 9.6 93.1 100.0
Canada 31.0 11.8 57.1 100.0
Italy 24.9 9.1 66.0 100.0
Japan 41.6 5.2 53.2 100.0
Netherlands 17.1 17.6 65.3 100.0
Sweden 20.5 -1.0 80.4 100.0
Spain 26.9 11.4 61.7 100.0
US -7.9 15.6 92.2 100.0
Average 18.9 9.9 71.1 100.0
Source: Author's calculations from OECD Financial Statistics.
Again, corporate saving is the primary source in these developed countries, with a
participation of 71.1%. Given the difference in financial development between the two country
groups, this figure, in spite of being lower than in Latin America, appears to be high. Ratifying
the validity of the pecking order once more, debt financing (18.9%) exceeds the equity raised
(9.9%). The dispersion across countries is greater than in Latin American countries, while
changes over time in each country (not reported) repeat the volatile pattern encountered in Latin
America.
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Section 3: Corporate Saving and Macroeconomic Factors: An
Econometric Exploration
While very few studies have analyzed total private savings in Latin America (see
Edwards (1995, op.cit.) and Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991)), no one has investigated the role
of corporate saving in the determination of the private saving and investment rate in the region as
a whole. Most likely, the lack of information about this variable is to be blamed. To overcome
this omission, an econometric exploration will be carried out in this section. The sample consists
of 49 pooled cross-section, time-series observations (7 time-series observations for each of the
seven countries) over the period 1990-1996. While aware of potential size and measurement
problems, this is a first step to launch a deeper discussion on corporate saving.
We are especially interested in addressing two questions: i) Do capital-market
imperfections matter for private saving?, and ii) Is there full offset between corporate and
household saving?.
A major problem at this point is the joint endogeneity of most macroeconomic variables.
In particular, the corporate and household components of saving are jointly determined, and the
same may be expected regarding corporate saving and investment. To deal with this, two-stage
least squares will be used to estimate the following equations:
cs xi t i t
cs
i i t,
'
, ,= + + +l l q e0 1   i = 1, ..., 7        t = 1, ..., 7
ps cs xi t i t i t
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where i stands for each of the 7 countries, t represents each of the 7 time-series units. cs, ps, and
pi stand for corporate saving,  private saving, and  private investment, respectively, while  x in
each particular equation represents a set of explanatory variables associated with the
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corresponding dependent variable. q represents country characteristics assumed to be common to
the three endogenous variables.
We postulate that xcs  includes the following variables: the maximum marginal tax rate on
personal income (source: Edwards (op.cit.)), a very crude measure for the tax disadvantage of
dividend payout; the current account balance as a share of GDP, which is expected to capture the
substitutability between domestic and foreign saving; the volume of bank credit to the private
sector as a share of GDP, thought of as another possible substitute of corporate saving; and the
economy's rate of growth, as a proxy for profitability. The vector xps comprises a number of
variables expected to explain household saving as a fraction of GDP. The current account balance
captures a possible crowding-out of personal saving for foreign saving. The existence of
borrowing constraints is also tested through the ratio credit to the private sector to GDP. The
introduction of the corporate saving and the consolidated public balance, both as a share of GDP,
serves to evaluate the extent to which households pierce the corporate veil and satisfy the
Ricardian equivalence.  The economy's growth rate is also included. In this short-run study, a
positive sign would be suggesting that growth is perceived as temporary, and/or a precautionary
motive exists (see Carroll and Weil (1993) for a study on long-run causality of growth on saving).
Finally, the private investment rate is explained in terms of the investment opportunities,
measured here by the rate of growth, and the availability of internal and external financing
sources, namely, corporate saving, domestic credit, and foreign saving. In the latter case, positive
signs on the financing sources would indicate that capital-market imperfections are relevant.
Under these circumstances, the Modigliani-Miller (1958) proposition about capital structure
irrelevance would not hold.9 The remaining controlling variables in the three equations are the
average inflation rate and the index of rule of law (source: World Bank growth database),
intended to assess the role of the policy and institutional environment.
                                                                
9 In fact there are many different reasons for the Modigliani-Miller (1958) proposition not to hold, among
them, tax considerations, financial distress, transaction costs, and informational frictions (see Harris and
Raviv (1991), Copeland and Weston (1988), and Hubbard (op.cit.)).
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Since some additional explanatory variables may also be suspected of being endogenous,
they were instrumentalized as well. The real exchange rate, the log of the black market premium,
and the lagged value of the current account were used as instruments for the current account
balance. For the growth rate, the instruments were its own lagged value, the lagged private
investment rate, and a dummy with value 1 for 1995 and 1996 and 0 otherwise, representing the
external shock caused by the Mexican crisis of December 1994. For the ratio credit to the private
sector to GDP, the stock market capitalization and its own lagged value were employed. The
fiscal public balance was instrumentalized through its own lagged value. It was assumed that the
index of rule of law, the  marginal income tax rate, and the dummy variable are exogenous. The
index of rule of law and the tax rate, as well as the inflation rate, are taken as cross-section
characteristics, while the rest are time-series variables. Results are reported in the following table:
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Table  18
Regression Results
Dependent Variables
Explanatory Variables Corporate Private Private
Saving Saving Investment
Rate Rate Rate
Corporate Saving Rate (% of GDP) 0.606 0.762
(5.301) (5.312)
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -0.271 0.782 -0.009
(-1.382) (4.926) (-0.050)
Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) -0.072 0.165 0.213
(-1.187) (3.441) (4.437)
Public Sector Balance (% of GDP) -0.627
(-3.677)
Personal Income Tax Rate 0.197
(5.607)
Growth Rate -0.220 0.387 0.566
(-1.431) (3.443) (4.075)
Index of Rule of Law 0.972 0.689 0.036
(1.865) (1.583) (0.082)
Average Inflation Rate 0.000 0.000 0.001
(-0.864) (1.223) (1.824)
F-Test (p-value) 8.21 (0.000) 27.26 (0.000) 26.12 (0.000)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.490 0.794 0.644
No. of Observations 42 42 42
*T-Statistics (based on White's variance estimators) in parenthesis at the bottom of
estimated coefficients. Two-stage least squares were used in the estimation. Instruments
are listed in the text.
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As explained earlier, the estimation was carried out with two-stage least squares.
However, ordinary least squares without instrumental variables yielded similar outcomes,
providing an out-of-sample robustness check once the sample size went up from 42 to 49. In this
case, the tests of Ramsey and Cook-Weisberg allowed to reject the hypotheses of correlation
between the explanatory variables and of heteroskedasticity, respectively.10 The estimators'
variances were calculated using White's heteroskedastic-consistent procedure. Also important to
note is that the estimated coefficients were reasonably robust to specification changes.
Given the limited sample size and potential measurement problems, any conclusion from
the estimation should be cautious. However, the results are challenging and are called to pave the
way for subsequent research in this area.  The first observation is that the time variation of the
corporate saving rate is poorly predicted by the present set of macroeconomic variables. In fact,
the main predictor is the marginal personal income tax rate. Compensating for the global
poorness of the estimation, this variable can be considered exogenous (at least, more exogenous
than other variables), thus representing a valid instrument. It is noticeable that alternative sources
of corporate funding do not seem to crowd out the generation of internal funds (corporate saving).
In particular, the corporate saving rate rises simultaneously with the foreign saving rate, although
the effect is not economically significant, and neither is it the depressing impact of the expansion
in domestic credit. The rate of growth enters negatively but without attaining an acceptable
significance level.
Although the coefficient are not significant and therefore they do not convey any reliable
information, the results are interesting enough to be subject to some speculation. A plausible
interpretation for these outcomes would be that, unlike domestic credit, foreign saving has not
been channeled towards corporate investment but towards consumer credit. The negative
                                                                
10 The regressions were also run through a panel data technique using Generalized Least Squares with an
unrestricted error covariance matrix. Once again, the estimation yielded results similar to those reported.
Moreover, it led to discard any concern about serial autocorrelation within each cross-section unit.
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(although statistically insignificant) sign on domestic credit and growth may indicate that an
improvement in credit terms, linked to higher net worth and availability of funds, leads to some
increased dividend payout. In view that the dividend payout has been extremely low in the past,
cash distributions may have had a market valuation benefit that outweighed the costs of resorting
to credit. 11  A priori, if profits increase with the rate of growth, and if internal funds are less
expensive than alternative sources, it is to be expected for growth to have a positive effect on
corporate saving. The negative sign would suggest that the reduction in the differential cost of
external finance in good economic times (see Bernanke et al. (1996)) turned an increase in
dividends more valuable than retention.
The second column in Table 18 displays the private saving rate estimation. In sharp
contrast to corporate saving, a one percent of GDP increase in foreign saving (current account
deficit) is associated with a fall of 0.78 percentage points reduction in private saving, while the
same increase in domestic credit elevates the private saving rate by 0.17 percentage points. The
first finding gives rise to the presumption that the crowding-out effect of foreign saving on
private saving runs through the household component rather than the corporate one. Our
hypothesis is that current account deficits relax households' liquidity constraints12, although they
do that not by promoting additional lending through financial intermediaries but mainly by
increasing commercial consumer credit to finance the purchase of durables.
This line of reasoning also reconciles the simultaneous existence of liquidity constraints,
reflected in several episodes of "consumption boom" in Latin American countries in the 1990s,
and the positive impact of the volume of domestic credit on private saving. 13 The very expansion
                                                                
11 Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1997) offer some indirect evidence by showing that retained earnings ratios
for listed companies in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico have lowered over the period 1990-1994
compared to the 80s, although remaining above 86%.
12 This view implicitly assumes that the availability of foreign saving represents a shock to some extent
exogenous to these countries. Calvo et al. (1996) support this position. Conversely, in a standard permanent
income framework, the current account balance is an endogenous variable determined by consumption
decisions (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)).
13 Financial intermediaries may refrain from intensively providing consumer credit to avoid excessive risk-
taking arising from informational and contract enforcement features. Retail firms, attracted by the relatively
inelastic demand for financing on the part of some consumers, may have taken over this activity. Partial
evidence of this phenomenon is that the current account balance explains virtually nothing of the evolution
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of the financial system is likely to reduce transaction and information costs of the intermediation
process between savers and borrowers, making depositors less reluctant to give up control over
their savings. In other words, a larger -and thus supposedly better- financial system turn saving a
better substitute for consumption.14 As massive withdrawals from the banking system encourage
more withdrawals, confidence in the system creates a positive feedback. In this sense, it is
suggestive that the value and significance of the coefficients on domestic credit and the index of
rule of law get notoriously larger when the other variable is eliminated from the regression,
ratifying that the institutional setup is relevant when it comes to saving decisions. Regarding
public savings, the estimation corroborates that full Ricardian Equivalence fails on empirical
grounds, the compensation coefficient being well below -1 (-0.63, and statistically significant at a
1% level). Growth has an important impact, which leads to believe that private agents visualized
changes in GDP as temporary.
It is remarkable that some of the previous results on private savings are in accord to
previous works on Latin American private savings. Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991), analyzing
the period 1968-1988, find coefficients of public on private saving quantitatively similar to the
one in this study. Edwards' (1995, op.cit.) research on private saving in Latin America in 1970-
1992 finds a positive effect of growth and credit, a negative effect of foreign saving, and no
significant effect of inflation.
A major novelty of the present work is the integration of corporate saving into the
analysis. The estimated private saving equation reveals that households do not completely pierce
the corporate veil. Indeed, household saving falls only by 0.39 percentage points of GDP before a
one-percentage point increase in corporate saving. Economic policy implications of this partial
offset are discussed along with the conclusions.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
of domestic credit in the sample, implying that capital inflows were not fully intermediated by the financial
system.
14 It is sensible to hypothesize some household heterogeneity, with high-income agents acting as net savers,
and low-income agents suffering liquidity constraints and rationing in formal credit markets.
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Finally, the last column in Table 18 shows that the private investment rate is not driven
solely by profitability considerations, captured by the growth rate15, but also by the availability of
internal funds (corporate saving) and domestic credit. Estimated coefficients imply a one-to-one
combined effect from financing to investment, with about three fourths of the effect explained by
corporate saving. As claimed by different studies for developed countries, financing constraints
are crucial to understand the dynamics of corporate investment (see Hubbard (1998) for a survey,
and Kadapakkam et al. (1998)).16
                                                                
15 Other measures of profitability, like the GDP per capita and the  growth rate to lagged investment ratio,
yield the same result. The counterintuitive, positive sign on inflation can also be interpreted in this light. In
a context of unemployment in most countries, nominal wages did not adjust at the same pace as inflation,
which then boosted corporate profits. It is puzzling that, being a forward-looking activity, investment tends
to respond to current growth even though savers seem to perceive it as temporary. Myopia and reliance on
current information in a context of uncertainty may explain this behavior.
16 A possible caveat to this interpretation is that corporate saving is tightly associated to profits, and so it
may be just signaling investment opportunities as opposed to a financing constraint. However, the simple
correlation between corporate saving and different measures of profitability (see the previous footnote) is
negative, but not statistically significant, in all cases, offering support to the presence of actual financing
constraints.
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Conclusions
This study examined private saving behavior in Latin America during the 1990s, paying
special attention to the measurement and analysis of corporate saving. The first part dealt with the
theoretical and practical relevance of corporate saving, subsequently providing a measure of it for
seven countries of the region. The central lesson is the duality consumers/savers-firms/borrowers
is a unrealistic textbook representation. As should be clear from the earlier exposition, saving and
investment activities are not independent of each other and both of them are predominantly
accomplished by the same units: firms.
It was shown that corporate saving accounts for more than 67% of private saving in all
countries, and that it represents 80% of total sources of corporate funds over the period 1990-
1996. The high reliance on internal funds demonstrates that the financial vulnerability to negative
shocks has not been magnified by the growing access to outside sources over the period.
Afterwards, a regression analysis was undertaken to look for the macroeconomic factors
correlated with corporate saving. Although the sample size is not large and some measurement
problems might exist, the results are challenging and worthy of further research and debate. The
main findings were:
a) Household do not fully pierce the corporate veil. A one-percentage point of GDP increase in
corporate saving elevates private saving by 0.61 percentage points, which is substantially
higher than the nil effect expected under perfect trade-off. Capital-market imperfections and
different propensities to consume out of dividends vis-a-vis capital gains explain this
incomplete offset. This is a more than powerful argument against the lack of attention
towards corporate saving in previous private saving studies, in both Latin America and other
economies.
b) Foreign savings (current account deficits) crowd out household saving, but not corporate
saving. The crowding-out coefficient is high (0.78), leading to believe that liquidity
constraints are liberated as foreign savings becomes more available. Apparently, these funds
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are not entirely intermediated by the financial system but instead channeled as commercial
consumer credit. Corporate saving and investment are unresponsive to foreign savings,
suggesting again that capital inflows may have financed consumer goods, especially durables.
c) The expansion of banking credit to the private sector is associated with an increase in
household saving, without a significant effect on corporate saving. The first feature may be
revealing that the growth of the financial system builds savers' confidence instead of
promoting higher consumption, while the second phenomenon may be related to an increase
in dividend payout, which had been very low in the 80s.
d) Full Ricardian Equivalence between public and private savings is rejected on empirical
grounds. The compensation coefficient is -0.63 (the null hypothesis is -1).
e) The private investment rate is a function of not only profitability but also of the availability of
internal funds (corporate saving) and, to a lesser extent, of domestic credit. In particular, a
one-percentage point of GDP increase in these sources of funds generate an increase of 0.76
and 0.21 percentage points in the private investment rate, respectively. These estimates
uncover the presence of financing constraints.
From an economic policy standpoint, the study raises several interesting points regarding
savings promotion. It must be kept in mind that welfare considerations are being left out, though.
In the first place, the estimation highlights the risks surrounding tax-based stimuli to saving. In
particular, fiscal incentives to household saving at the expense of a higher burden on corporations
appear to be questionable in that they may end up reducing total private savings and investment.
Assuming a lump-sum tax and a balanced fiscal budget, this is equivalent to a (compulsory)
dividend. Total private savings is expected to fall because of the less-than-perfect offset between
corporate and household saving, whereas private investment is expected to fall as a result of
binding financing constraints.
As far as saving and investment are concerned, a broader access to foreign saving tends
to discourage private saving without promoting more investment. A priori, this is an argument
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favorable to proposals of capital controls. However, the debate involves other issues, such as the
long-run growth and welfare effects of trade and financial openness in terms of consumption
smoothing, productive efficiency and investment dynamics, as well as the link between capital
flows and macroeconomic stability. Conversely, the development of the domestic financial
system tends to favor aggregate private saving, rejecting the notion that financial reforms may be
detrimental to saving decisions.
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Appendix on Methodological Assumptions
In this Appendix, the assumptions and the possible associated biases brought on by the
estimation of gross corporate saving are made explicit. All figures refer to nonfinancial firms, and
are expressed in nominal U.S. dollars; where necessary, the conversion of national currency
amounts was made at the annual average official exchange rate.
International debt issues include any form of foreign bank loans and bonds, and include,
unlike equity and domestic debt, only net flows. Equity issues, containing domestic and
international offerings, are presented on a gross basis, given the lack of information on
repurchases. Similarly, domestic debt issues do not net out debt repayments. The only exception
is Mexico, for which it was possible to obtain net financing flows. As long as the data are
expressed in gross terms, the access to external sources of funds is overestimated and corporate
saving is underestimated.
Domestic bank loans were estimated from total deposits in the financial system.
Domestic credit to the private sector is not an adequate measure not only because it includes
credit to households, but also because it may imply some double-counting. Due to the fact that
debt and equity issues by the private sector are not broken down according to the financial or
non-financial category of the firms, we were forced to assume that all the foreign and domestic
debt raised by financial intermediaries is channeled to non-financial companies. As a result, only
the loans funded with deposits must be added to obtain an estimation of bank loans.
Following the previous assumption, deposits of both businesses and households must
finance loans to the government and public enterprises, credit to households, reserves, and other
investments.  An obstacle here is that there is scarce information about the businesses and
households classification of deposits and loans. Some fragmentary data are provided by Rojas-
Suarez and Weisbrod (1997), who indicate that in recent years corporate deposits represented
37.1% of total in Chile, 50.3% in Mexico, and 45.1% in Peru.  Additionally, a Survey of
Financial Systems in Latin America elaborated by the Interamerican Development Bank in 1997
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shows that, as of September 1995, consumer credit and mortgages represent 22% of total credit in
Brazil, 21% in Chile, 44% in Colombia, and 11% in Mexico. Investments other than loans
constitute 28% of total deposits for all the countries except Peru. Based on these few point
observations, we took a crude estimate for all countries and years that 40% of  total deposits is
directed towards non-financial firms as net bank credit.
As explained earlier, the total change in assets comprises the change in gross fixed
investment, inventory, and cash and equivalents. Trade credit cancels out in the aggregate,
provided commercial ties with foreign firms are nil. Gross private investment is taken from
national accounts, subtracting public investment from total investment. Investment by public
enterprises and newly privatized firms is generally part of private investment. Lack of
information impedes to substract household investment. The change in inventory is also drawn
from national accounts, and attributed entirely to the private sector. The variation in cash and
equivalent working capital items is taken as equal to the deposits of the corporate sector in the
financial system, and therefore cancels out after the adjustment made on total deposits.
Since the available data comprises both private and public enterprises, as well as newly
privatized companies, equity issues related to the privatization process should be treated as a
mere substitution in the shareholding structure, by which shares by the government are
repurchased and its participation is taken over by private investors. In this sense, these issues
suffer from the same bias as other regular issues, in that they contribute to corporate saving
underestimation.   Regional aggregate information elaborated by IDB (1997) indicates that about
50% of total equity issues in 1990-1995 may be attributed to privatizations (see footnote 3). Lack
of information at country level renders troublesome to make the necessary adjustment.
Nevertheless, the global bias is likely to be unimportant, considering that privatization-related
equity issues account for just 1.7% of total sources of funds over the period 1990-1995.
Finally, the private saving rate is calculated as a residual from the identity indicating that
the difference between saving and investment, for both the private and public sector, equals the
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current account balance. The measurement problems of saving and investment data from using
national accounts information are explained in detail by Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1997).
39
Bibliography
Agosin M, T. Crespi, and L.S. Letelier (1997), "Explicaciones del Aumento del Ahorro en Chile",
Red de Centros de Investigacion Economica, mimeograph, Inter-American Development Bank,
Washington, D.C..
Bebczuk R. (1996), “Saving, Growth, and Financial System”, mimeograph, Distinguished Paper,
1996 Argentine Association of Banks Award, Buenos Aires.
Bernanke B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1996), "The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to
Quality", Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78.
Calderon Madrid A. (1996), "Determinantes del Ahorro Interno en Mexico: A Que se debio la
Caida en el Ahorro Privado durante los Años previos a la Crisis de 1994?", mimeograph, Red de
Centros de Investigacion Economica, mimeograph, Inter-American Development Bank,
Washington, D.C..
Calvo G., L. Leiderman, and C. Reinhardt (1996), "Inflows of Capital to Developing Countries in
the 1990s", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10.
Campbell J., Lo A., and MacKinlay A. (1997), The Econometrics of Financial Markets, Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
Cardenas M. and A. Escobar (1996), "Los Determinantes del Ahorro Privado en Colombia: 1925-
1994", Red de Centros de Investigacion Economica, mimeograph, Inter-American Development
Bank, Washington, D.C..
Carroll C. and D. Weil (1993), "Savings and Growth: A Reinterpretation", NBER Working
Papers, N0. 4470, September.
Comision Economica para America Latina (1997), Balance Economico Preliminar, CEPAL,
Santiago de Chile.
Cohen D. (1993), "Convergence in the Closed and in the Open Economy", in Giovannini A. (ed.),
Finance and Development: Issues and Experience, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Copeland T. and Weston J. (1988), Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, Addison Wesley.
Corbo V. and Schmidt-Hebbel K. (1991), “Public Policies and Saving in Developing Countries”,
Journal of Development Economics, Vol.36, No.1, 89-115.
Demirgüc-Kunt A. and Maksimovic V. (1996), “Financial Constraints, Uses of Funds, and Firm
Growth. An International Comparison”, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 1671, October.
Edwards S. (1995), “Why Are Saving Rates So Different Across Countries? An International
Comparative Analysis”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers, No.5097.
Fazzari S., Hubbard G., and Petersen B. (1988), “Financing Constraints and Corporate
Investment”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol.1, 141-195.
40
Gonzales de Olarte E., C. Levano de Rossi, and P. Lontop (1996), "Determinantes del ahorro
interno y ajuste estructural en el Peru, 1990-1995", mimeograph, Red de Centros de Investigacion
Economica, mimeograph, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C..
Greene W. (1993), Econometric Analysis, Prentice-Hall, Englewoods Cliffs, New Jersey.
Harris M. and A. Raviv (1991), “The Theory of Capital Structure”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 46,
No. 1, 297-355.
Hausmann R. and H. Reisen,eds.(1997), Promoting Savings in Latin America, IDB/OECD,
Washington D.C..
Hubbard R.G. (1998), "Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment", Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. 36, March, 193-225.
International Monetary Fund (1997), International Capital Markets, IMF, Washington D.C..
Interamerican Development Bank (1997), Progreso Economico y Social en America Latina, IDB,
Washington D.C..
Japelli T. and M. Pagano (1994), “Saving, Growth, and Liquidity Constraints”, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, Vol.109, No. 1, 83-109.
Kadapakkam P., P.C. Kumar, and L. Riddick (1998), "The impact of cash flows and firm size on
investment: The international evidence", Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol.22.
Miller M. (1977), "Debt and Taxes", Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, No.2, 261-275.
Modigliani F. and M. Miller (1958), "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory
of Investment", American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No.3, 261-297.
Myers S. (1984), “The Capital Structure Puzzle”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, No. 3, 575-591.
Normann G. and  Jeffrey Owens (1997), "Tax Effects on Household Saving: Evidence from
OECD Member Countries", in Hausmann R. and H. Reisen (op.cit.).
Obstfeld M. (1995), “International Capital Mobility in the 1990s”, in Kenen P. (ed.),
Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open Economy, Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
Obstfeld M. and Rogoff K. (1996), Foundations of International Macroeconomics, MIT Press,
Cambridge.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1997), Non-financial Enterprises
Financial Statements, OECD, Paris.
Poterba J. (1987), “Tax Policy and Corporate Saving”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
Vol.2, 455-503.
Poterba J. and L. Summers (1984), “The Economic Effects of Dividend Taxation”, in E. Altman
and M. Subrahmanyam, eds., Recent Advances in Corporate Finance, Richard D. Irwin.
41
Rajan R. and Zingales L. (1995), “What do we know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence
from International Data”, Journal of Finance, Vol.50, No.5, 1421-1460.
Reisen H. (1997), "The Limits of Foreign Savings", in Hausmann R. and H. Reisen (op. cit.).
Rojas-Suarez L. and S. Weisbrod (1997), "Financial Markets and the Behaviour of Private
Savings in Latin America", in Hausmann R. and H. Reisen (op.cit.)
Schmidt-Hebbel K. and L. Serven (1997), "Saving across the World", World Bank Discussion
Paper, No. 354.
